Artikel

Computer modeling of cooperation and altruistic punishment :

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Penilaian

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Understanding cooperation is a long-standing problem in both biological and social sciences. Emperical evidence in repeated public-good [PG] experiments shows that intermediate levels of cooperation at the beginning of the game are followed by a decline over time ending close to the non-cooperative equilibrium. On the other hand, recent experiments have shown that introducing the possibility of punishing the defectors in PG experiments leads to high cooperation levels notwithstanding the fact that the punishment itself constitutes a second-order PG dilemma. This, and similiar, results can be modeled using different types of actors. In this paper we use computer simulations to show that, using a plausible distribution of agent types whose behavior is related respectively to rational egoism [self interest], simple reciprocity and strong reciprocity schemes, it is possible to reproduce the result of PG experiments with a fair degree of accuracy at both the macro [aggregate] and.......yo.

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Judul Seri

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No. Panggil

J 300 Soc

Penerbit

: .,

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Bahasa

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Klasifikasi

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Tipe Media

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Tipe Pembawa

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Edisi

Social Complexity3, Nomor 1, 200723-35

Subjek

Cooperation
Public Good Experiment
Strong Reciprocity
Simulation

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